NO SELF NO PROBLEM by Chris Niebauer

Summary by William Brochs-Haukedal

There seems to be developing a trend towards testing traditional Western science, built on rational/empirical thought, against other kinds of thinking. Religion, Eastern philosophy and fringe Western psychology are the most frequent suspects. This book looks at similarities between some central elements of (mainly) Buddhist thinking and newer findings in neuropsychology, pointing to some possible implications interesting for most of us: Psychological health, happiness and the pursuit of meaning (to mention the most central concepts).

The book's main argument, as reflected in the title, is that the experienced self is an illusion. For the reader not familiar with Buddhism this idea could be surprising, to say the least, but it is a cornerstone of that system. From there, Niebauer argues that neuropsychology research points to the same conclusion. For example, there are many studies documenting the brain's readiness for interpreting events, internal as well as external. Moreover, this interpretation is more like a construction activity rather than "research", which always leads to incomplete and often wrong ideas of reality.

These constructed representations of the world and inner states, argues the author, likely is behind feelings of dissatisfaction, anxiety, depression and unhappiness. Here, he cites Buddhism which has offered the same explanation for thousands of years. The Buddhist (and the author's) solution is to get rid of the self. No self, no problem.Today, much of psychotherapy as well as mindfulness and similar practises builds on the same arguments, although those practises target the mis-representations rather than the self as such

The book is relevant for those searching for research based insights on how the brain and mind work, and who wonder if such knowledge has practical value for themselves. After reading it you will have a general understanding of those issues, as well as an idea about some central tenets of Eastern philosophy and spirituality.

The book is an easy read (given its complex topic) and contains suggestions for personal experimentation. Some of its conclusions will be deemed somewhat outside the field's academic main street, and will deter some readers. A discussion of this issue would have enhanced the text, but I suppose that would be outside the interest for its main targeted readers.

I enjoyed the book and would recommend it to all interested in these matters.

                                                                                      ---- 0 ----

A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE SOUL by Goetz, S. and Taliaferro, C. (2011)

Summary by William Brochs-Haukedal


The soul? Seriously? Most of us (that is we who was born, raised and educated in Scandinavia after WWII) have relegated the soul to the fairytales. Science and electric light took care of that.


On the other hand, deep down many of us also feel that there must be more to being human than the  sleep-work-eat routine carried out by the accidental biological robots that we are led to believe are you and me. If you, like me, have ever entertained thoughts like this, then Goetz and Taliaferro have some good news for you.


First of all they spell out the main philosophical ideas about what we call “soul”, starting with the ancient Greeks. It seems that philosophers like Socrates, Plato and Aristoteles thought about “the soul” (psyche) as the phenomenon we would call “the principle of life” and probably “consciousness” and “mind”. This may disappoint some, but remember that the book is about philosophy and not religion. And all the same the asked the questions that most people are taken with in the first place: Is the soul something different from the body? And if it is, will it survive the death of the body?


The rest of the book are really thorough and fine-grained discussions of the same questions and their derivatives. The authors take us through Medieval Christianity, Continental thought (represented by not the least R. Descartes), and some relevant British philosophers like Locke. After this tour de force they present a thorough analysis of the main issues associated with a dualistic perspective on humans (the soul is one kind of substance and the body another). Lastly, they turn to current discussions about the soul in contemporary thought (philosophy and science).


So what about the soul, then? Here are some main points you may take home after studying this text:


  1. The soul, philosophically speaking, is evident in our mental life

  2. There are several ways of structuring this, but of greatest interest is the capacity for synthesizing a myriad sense-information into one coherent experience

  3. This phenomenological “space” seems not to be directly related to anything physical (like the brain), although they do (of course) interact.

  4. The hows of point three over is not in any way clear at this point in time

  5. Naturalism/physicalism/materialism have problems of their own (what is matter anyway?) and do not represent “killer” arguments against dualism.

  6. Given our current state of knowledge the main issues boils down to beliefs about the nature of Reality

  7. Remember that this is a “Short history of…”. That is probably the reason why the authors did not go into older influences on the idea of souls. The early Egyptians did, after all build religions and even cultures and societies based on beliefs in immortal souls. And they had inherited the idea from even older sources. Also, they barely touch upon issues like practical, psychological and religious consequences of believing (or not) in the existence of souls. And are souls something else or added to the psychological space that makes up our lonely existence? Those, and a host of other questions are not, or very lightly touched upon.

  8. But this is not a criticism detracting from the book’s value. On the contrary, the text demonstrates that there are no philosophical or scientific arguments or facts making inquires into the soul obsolete. And that is really something.

  9. The book is very readable, interesting and (to me) strangely relevant. It gives the reader a firm platform on which to continue studying the concept of “soul” from a philosophical perspective. I would guess that students, scholars, and educated readers interested in this topic are the main targets for this book. I have noticed that other reviewers are also generally positive, but some points out that the authors openly argues for the dualistic perspective of the soul. To me, it is a valuable trait that they are open about it.

                                                                                                    --- 0 ---

CONSCIOUS BY Annaka Harris (2019)

Summary by William Brochs-Haukedal

This book is about consciousness and a best seller at that. So what is the message that has pulled so many readers in? Annaka Harris starts with pointing out that there is a great mystery staring at us at every moment, without us taking notice very often: We are conscious. Or we have consciousness. The phrase you choose depends on your perspective. She then sets out to “… pass along the exhilaration that comes from discovering just how surprising consciousness is.” I think she succeeds in pointing out and exploring some fascinating issues, but if you are familiar with meditation, the mindfulness literature and or cognitive science, you will not be very surprised. That being said, she does a good job in presenting those ideas in a very readable way.

Her starting point is that consciousness is experience itself. This is the reason why we do not continuously ask ourselves why “… any collection of matter [i.e. mine or your body] in the universe be conscious?” How come we are conscious at all? What does she mean by consciousness? As noted, Harris argues that the essence of consciousness is experience. Here she builds upon philosophers like Thomas Nagel, and his classic essay “What is it like to be a bat?” is often cited. In this text he speculates on the phenomenal world (the umwelt as called by another writer) of a bat. Depending heavily on its own sonar when navigating, its experience of the world must be very different from ours. But the main point is that it experiences: there is something that it is like to be that bat. Somehow, such an idea does not go well with for instance a stone. In other words there is some kind of consciousness in some “collections of matter” (a bat, you and me) but not in others (a stone).

When, how and why are “the light turned on” particular collections of matter? To Harris (and the rest of us, probably) this is another great mystery. “But hold on”, you may say. “Consciousness simply follows from the development of a central nervous system. When this reaches a certain level of complexity consciousness appears.” According to some, Harris included, it is not that simple. It is, basically, the same question we humans have put to the Universe: How could something come out of nothing? Or in our case: How can consciousness/experience/sentience come out of insentient matter? This question is what the philosopher David Chalmer called “the hard problem of consciousness.” (as opposed to the easy problems like where is the language center located in the brain etc).

The author next points out that some of our most basic beliefs about consciousness may be wrong: 1. That consciousness in another system can be detected from the outside, and 2. That consciousness is essential to our behavior. Various empirical studies are presented supporting those two observations. To readers not familiar with the literature this is a fascinating list of studies. Examples are the locked-in syndrome, where the body is paralyzed but consciousness completely intact. In such cases, there are often no way of knowing whether the person is conscious or not. Another (disturbing) example is anesthesia awareness, where the patient is given narcosis but is staying conscious all the same. The only person knowing this is the poor patient undergoing surgery! A different kind of studies demonstrates the opposite: that for instance trees and artificial intelligence (AI) exhibit behavior usually taken as indicators of consciousness. Here, an observer may be led to believe there is consciousness where there is not.

To sum up: the first belief above is not correct. What about the other? Harris is convinced that it does not do any better, and finds evidence in neuroscience. One well accepted but surprising finding about the brain has to do with how it processes information and generates understanding. The process looks like this (simplified of course): the brain receives sensory input, processes those together with existing knowledge from memory, makes a decision, creates a meaningful thought (this is…), and at last presents the result into consciousness. So, understanding (at the basic level) is a construction made by your system (not by you as “I”), and it is always after the fact. You live in the past, so to say.

But there is one more finding of the same caliber: Neuroscience has also demonstrated that our will/intentions are, at least in many cases, illusions constructed after the fact – so to say. A range of studies and analyses are presented by the author to support this claim. But the text is quite detailed and the findings well established so I will simply refer the interested reader to the book itself. Harris concludes that the “I” (my consciousness) simply witness decisions unfolding. In other words, consciousness does not seem to be essential to behavior (belief 2 above).

The self is at the core of consciousness. All our experiences happen to or around the self. And the world within and without is perceived as a unified and integrated whole. We all know this, of course, but the mechanism behind is not equally well known. It is actually the result of the brain doing its work through the “binding” processes. These provide us with the “illusion that physical occurrences are perfectly synchronized with our conscious experience of them in the present moment.” In addition, all sensory data are processed by the brain and added to all other data (like knowledge stored in memory), presenting consciousness with a unified and meaningful story about what is going on.

But the sense of a self can be taken out of the equation. One may, as in meditation, be aware of everything taking place in consciousness, but without a sense of the self. Neuroscience has demonstrated that this sense of self is located to an area of the brain called “the default mode network.” Meditation, psychedelica and other influences can still the activity in this particular area. Consciousness then persists, but the sense of the self is lost. In other words, the self and the consciousness do not depend upon each other. 

Split-brain research is part of the data leading to this conclusion, and more. There are some cases where the “bridge” connecting the left and right brain hemispheres (corpus calossum) is severed. This leaves the person with two brain-halves which have turned out to be somewhat specialized functionally. The left is known to harbor the language center and lean towards linear thinking modes. The right is better with aesthetics, emotions and space perception (this is very simplified). It also turns out that decisions may be made in one such hemisphere, without the other knowing about it and sometimes they are in conflict. So, in effect, there is one person but two consciousnesses.

One other finding from this research is that when the person experiences conflicting intentions, and/or act differently from what was planned, he or she will present a story (unconsciously) made up as an explanation. It seems that we all carry with us this capability which is usually called “the interpreter.” This function is probably also responsible for keeping up the pretense of having a self, orchestrating our mental life.

The key seems to be that consciousness is not tethered to a particular location in the brain, nor to a particular function like the self. And certainly not to the pineal gland, as thought by Descartes. It is even hard to pinpoint the exact function of consciousness, according to Harris. She then wonders if consciousness may be intrinsic to all matter? In this speculation, she does not refer to thoughts or sense of self, remember. It is about consciousness in its raw and most basic form. With humans, consciousness is involved in thoughts, but in animals it would be something different altogether (“what is it like to be a bat”) but still some kind of experience.


This is actually the view referred to as panpsychism. There are many forms of panpsychism, but the one chosen by Harris and referred to above is quite straight forward. Whichever version, they all target physicalism at its most central problem: Matter is held to be the only “reality”, and non-material phenomena (like the consciousness) have some kind of material basis. In this view, consciousness is held to emerge from processes in the brain. Panpsychism, on the other hand, have another idea.

Panpsychism points to two problems with physicalism in this context: 1. They reduce everything to matter, but do not explain what matter is at the most basic level. It is common knowledge now that at the particle level matter (you, for instance) is mostly empty space with some particles clinging together creating structures. But what are those particles really? Some kind of energy, probably, but what is energy? There are no good answers. 2. If consciousness is an epiphenomenon of brain activity: what does this mean? It is a statement explaining nothing. A wave emerges from the sea, but it is still the sea. If consciousness emerges out of brain activity, it is something else than those activities. Brain activity is electro-chemical reactions, while consciousness is a nonmaterial experience (or being, as existential philosophers would remind us).

As Harris points out, we are back to the hard problem of consciousness: How can consciousness come out of insentient matter? Hard-nosed physicalists/materialists will deny there such a problem. Instead they offer the explanation that consciousness is an illusion. But this is almost silly: Illusions presuppose consciousness, after all. Panpsychism, on their side, points out that the only possible explanation is that consciousness in its raw form is an inherent quality of matter – or basically the same thing.

These are, of course, strange notions whichever view one adopts. Mainstream science is not, in general, partial to the idea of panpsychism, and the latter have its own problems to sort out. What should be remembered, though, is that today’s brand of panpsychism distinguish between thoughts, sense of self and unified perceptions on the one hand, and raw consciousness without those qualities on the other. The latter is not readily available but may be touched upon in meditation and under the influence of certain drugs.

To sum up: We all know we are conscious, but how does it come to be, what use does it have and who have it or not? Harris have no definitive answers, but points out some salient issues and various attempts at clarifying them. It is still a mystery but one we should never forget. And as the author alludes to: This might well be what consciousness is for.


(as the book is available in Norwegian only, this review is written in that language)


Oppsummering av William Brochs-Haukedal. 



Eksistensiell psykologi (heretter EP) er ikke det første en møter i psykologstudiet, men det er minst to grunner til å titte nærmere på denne delen av faget. For det første er EP beslektet med humanistisk psykologi, og er derfor del av en tradisjon som har satt viktige spor etter seg i dagens akademiske og praktiske psykologi. For det annet undersøker EP grunnleggende aspekter og utfordringer ved det være menneske, og er derfor relevant for alle tenkende personer.


Forfatteren har tatt for seg dette fagfeltet, og tilbyr en oversikt over vesentlige tema og viktige bidragsytere. Det er samtidig en reflektert og godt integrert tekst som gir leseren et nyttig utgangspunkt for videre studier i dette temaet.


Hva er så eksistensiell psykologi (EP)?  Forfatteren forklarer det slik: «Eksistensiell psykologi undersøker hvilken rolle det har for hvordan vi føler, tenker og handler at vi er oppmerksomme (og uoppmerksomme) på livets eksistensielle grunnanliggender.» Og hva menes med «eksistensielle grunnanliggender»? Det er i mange tilfeller tale om livets tragiske aspekter, som lidelse, vissheten om adskillelse fra dem man er glad i og at man en gang skal dø. Radikale forandringer med oppløsning av det vante er også en del av dette bildet, sammen med livsvalg og andre kilder til stor usikkerhet. Selv om slike fenomener bærer i seg potensialet for noe positivt (bevissthet om døden gir energi til å gripe det livet man har etc.), så er de samtidig ubehagelig og utfordrende.


Livet, og utfordringene det byr på, kan altså være vanskelig å håndtere på en måte som kan forenes med et rikere og meningsfullt liv. Dette er altså EPs anliggende. Eksistensiell filosofi, og dermed også -psykologi, er nært forbundet med fenomenologi, dvs. studiet av hvordan verden fremtrer for oss. EP er derfor opptatt av den enkeltes forståelse av sine omgivelser og hvilken mening de tillegger disse og sine opplevelser. Det er altså førstepersonsperspektivet som gjelder, og som utforskes i samtaler, litteratur og kunst.


Som forfatteren peker på trekker EP store veksler på eksistensiell filosofi, men også på litteratur og kunst i tillegg til religioner. Mennesker har i all tid reflektert rundt seg selv og tilværelsen og EP står på skuldrene av den kunnskapsbasen slike funderinger har avleiret. Vår tids interesse for buddhistisk psykologi og mindfulness er også en del av dette bildet.


Kapittel to har fokus på noe som står svært sentralt i eksistensiell filosofi: Hva betyr det for et menneske å være til? Først og fremt er vi. Vi er aktivt fortolkende og meningsskapende; vi er grunnleggende sett opptatt av å skape mening i vår opplevelse av det å være til. Vi er, og prøver å forstå hva dette innebærer for oss som personer. Men å være til betyr ikke at vi er et vesen med bestemte og uforanderlige egenskaper. I eksistensiell filosofi, og -psykologi, er vi det vi til enhver tid gjør. Siden vi forutsettes å kunne velge våre handlinger fritt, så har vi også ansvar for våre valg. Dette prinsippet har sitt opphav i eksistensialismens anti-essenstialistiske utgangspunkt: Du har ingen «essens» i betydningen av en fast og uforanderlig kjerne. Som det heter i Peer Gynt, er mennesker som en løk: lag på lag uten en kjerne. Dette betyr likevel ikke at vi kan definere oss selv helt som vi ønsker. Vi befinner oss alle i bestemte livssituasjoner med begrensninger i mulighetsrommet. Det er føringer utenfor oss som bestemmer hva som er mulig og ikke. Troen på en absolutt fri vilje er et eksempel på det Sartre kaller «vond tro» (mauvaise foi/bad faith).


Oppmerksomhet på livets store spørsmål og utfordringer (døden, frihet, nærhet til andre, mening mm.) kan oppleves overveldende. Dette kan være angstfremkallende, noe en prøver å unngå med forsvarsmekanismer/unnvikelse. Et av de best dokumenterte funnene i psykiatri og klinisk psykologi er at slike unnvikelser skaper sine egne problemer i neste omgang. Det å unngå åpne plasser fordi de skaper angst virker fornuftig, men det betyr jo også at en må unngå mange steder en ellers ville besøkt. I tillegg kommer etter hvert emosjonelle reaksjoner som kompliserer det hele. Eksistensiell psykologi angriper derfor denne problemstillingen ved å gå tilbake til de eksistensielle grunnleggende spørsmålene, og å hjelpe den enkelte til å finne måter å konstruere mening i dem og å akseptere dem. De er jo uansett en del av den tilværelsen man nå engang er «kastet inn i».


Praktisk EP handler derfor i stor grad om å ta tilbake ansvaret for ens eksistensielle valg og konstruering av mening. Den neste utfordringen, som da oppstår, er at det iflg. eksistensiell filosofi ikke finnes sikre holdepunkter for slike valg. Det finnes ingen entydig fasit når det gjelder verdier og virkelighetsbeskrivelser; ingen absolutter. Vi er overlatt til oss selv for å finne frem til noe som fungerer for oss. Men dette betyr som nevnt at vi må stå til ansvar for valgene vi tar, overfor oss selv men også overfor andre. Vi kan altså ikke gjøre hva vi vil, siden valgene våre har konsekvenser. Dette betyr i sin tur at jo mer informert vi er, og jo mer vi kan frigjøre oss fra ønskedrømmer og fantasier til fordel for realistiske vurderinger, dess bedre valg kan vi ta.


Dersom vi ikke vil eller kan ta slikt ansvar for oss selv kan resultatet bli såkalt «eksistensiell skyld»: vi føler skyld overfor oss selv og andre fordi vi ikke er tro mot våre overbevisninger. Løsningen er å ta tilbake ansvaret for egne valg.


Det er også sentralt i EP at mennesket søker mening med tilværelsen. Men det er like sentralt at verden ikke tilbyr mening uten videre. Mening er ikke noe en finner, men noe en skaper. For forfatteren er mening med livet dette: «...en opplevelse av at du finner sammenheng i livet, at du finner hensikt med hva du gjør, og at du opplever at livet ditt har betydning.» s. 101. Slik mening oppstår altså ikke av seg selv, men er noe man opparbeider seg og konstruerer. Det krever både engasjement, refleksjon og utprøving. Ærlighet overfor en selv og sine reaksjoner er også en del av dette. Forfatteren er tydelig på at en likevel ikke bare kan tenke seg frem til mening med livet. Grunnen til dette er at mening noe som oppstår når en er i kontakt med sin kropp, tanker og følelser. Slik kontakt med alle dimensjoner av en selv betinger at en utfordrer seg selv med autentiske opplevelser i verden.


En annen interessant og velkjent vinkling til mening er hentet fra Victor Frankl. Hans mest leste bok handler om menneskets iboende vilje til mening. Til grunn for denne meningen ligger viljen til å «nå ut over seg selv og tjene noe som er større enn selvet» s. 109. Dette kaller Frankl for selvtransendens, og har blitt et sentralt begrep i flere nyere psykologiske perspektiver. Frankl diskuterer også menneskers søken etter det som kalles ultimat mening, som er den høyeste formen for selvtransendens. Og her setter boken lys på det som ellers blir vanskelig med eksistensiell filosofi og -psykologi: Frihet og selvstendige valg er av største betydning, men vi mangler et absolutt grunnlag å vurdere disse valgene mot. Dermed er i prinsippet alle mulige alternativer like gode. 


Løsningen, eller veien ut av dette dilemmaet er nettopp Frankls ultimate mening. I det minste når denne er basert på en bestemt opplevelse som er beskrevet mange ulike steder opp gjennom tidene: «Ultimat mening kan knytte seg til en spirituell erfaring av å ta del i en større helhet i verden, slik dette kommer til uttrykk i det psykologiske fenomenet «ærefrykt» (awe på engelsk) s. 109. Dette er Maslows «peak experience” men også beskrevet av en lang rekke mystikere, diktere, kunstnere, filosofer og religiøse. Colin Wilson (i «Beyond the outsider») brukte også dette fenomenet til å «redde» eksistensialismen fra en ufruktbar satsing på samfunnsengasjement alene som plattform til å skape mening i tilværelser. Poenget med slike opplevelser, som de er beskrevet i litteraturen av dem som har hatt den, er at distinksjonen mellom det meningsløse og det meningsfylte oppheves. Eksistensen fremstår som et fullstendig enhetlig fenomen, kjennetegnet av en dyp mening.


Slikt er vanskelig, og kanskje umulig å studere vitenskapelig (selv om forskere som Abraham Maslow og Mihalyi Csikszenthmihalyi, William James m.fl. har gjort en stor innsats her). Derfor har slike transpersonale opplevelser gjerne tilhørt religion, kunst, filosofi og alternative kulturer. Samtidig er det stor interesse for dette nå, også i akademiske miljøer og ikke minst i nevropsykologisk forskning. EP har mye å tilby for dem som leter etter en psykologi som retter seg mot grunnleggende utfordringer ved å være et menneske i verden. 



Per-Einar Binder (2020): En kort introduksjon til eksistensiell psykologi. Bergen: Fagbokforlaget